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Summary
This article shows that the management of water resources in Late Sasanian and Early Islamic Iraq (6th- 10th centuries AD) implied the participation of local communities and the mutual cooperation of landholders. The organisation of water management in the Late Sasanian Period (6th-7th centuries) depended on a highly complex system of interaction between local communities, aristocratic rulers and the imperial bureaucracy. This interaction allowed the government to gather information from different regions of the empire and to understand the needs of the different stakeholders. As such the system provided a favorable institutional framework for the expansion of irrigated agriculture.  The system changed when landholding conditions were transformed in the Early Islamic period, during the ninth century. These institutional transformations allowed the influence of a group of tax-farmers and merchant-bankers to increase. Irrigation policies were therefore bent to the interests of these new elites, which often lay in short-term gains rather than in long-term success. The article suggests that in the long run, these socio-economic and institutional changes contributed substantially to the breakdown of the agricultural system in Ancient Iraq.
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Introduction

In Late Antique and Early Medieval Iraq (6th- 10th centuries AD), agriculture was heavily dependent on the organisation of and investment in water management. The period in question, between the sixth and the tenth centuries, saw the transition from the Sasanian Empire (which covered a large part of the Middle East between 226 and 651 CE) to the establishment of the Islamic Caliphates and the decline of the Abbasid dynasty. The rulers of the Sasanian and Abbasid empires had their power bases in Iraq. By ‘Iraq’, we mean the fertile alluvial plains of Mesopotamia situated along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which were known as the Sawād in the Early Islamic period.​[1]​ Covering about 200,000 km2, the Sawād was thus somewhat smaller than the present-day state of Iraq. The financial stability of the state was dependent upon the efficient functioning of the water management system, since the land tax was the main source of support for the two empires that consecutively ruled this area, the Sasanian Empire and the Islamic Caliphates. The land tax provided much higher returns than any tax on trade.​[2]​ The administration of the land tax and water management were therefore closely interconnected.​[3]​
	An elaborate irrigation water management system sustained the high soil productivity of the Mesopotamian plains. In the ninth and tenth centuries an environmental collapse occurred, expressed by demographic contraction, decreased harvest outputs and declining building activities​[4]​. This article wants to retell this well-known story from an institutional perspective, with a particular focus on the role of landowners and their relations to other social groups. In part this has become possible thanks to recent publications of studies on the Sasanian period. 
After decades of debate centred on ‘top-down’ versus ‘bottom-up’ versions of water-related policies,​[5]​ recent studies have painted a more nuanced picture of Mesopotamian water management. On the one hand, recent work confirms that state intervention and investment played a crucial role in the economic performance of the Sasanian Empire.​[6]​ This has been shown for other parts of the empire as well, a good example being the city of Merv in Turkmenistan. Here, the discovery of cotton seed and the development of irrigation systems in the area have been shown to be connected to imperial investment in the development of this new crop. It was previously thought that the diffusion of cotton began in the Early Islamic period, as a result of investment by new Muslim elites.​[7]​ The development of another cash crop, sugar cane, likewise seems to have been related to state initiatives. Traces of its cultivation survive in Khuzestan (in present-day Iran), an area where we can distinguish clear signs of Sasanian imperial investments.​[8]​ To take another part of the Sasanian Empire as an example, Rezakhani’s study of the Deh Lūrān plain (Iran) and the Dāmghān plain (Iran) emphasises the role played by local managers in administering a network of local canals, which connected regional areas to a large imperial infrastructure.​[9]​ Scholars also point to the presence of state investment in water management in the Early Islamic period,​[10]​ often stressing the continuity with the pre-Islamic, Sasanian past.​[11]​
On the other hand, recent studies show that government investment in water management in Late Antiquity depended on cooperation between the aristocracy and the crown.​[12]​ Hartnell emphasises the collaboration of the court and the aristocracy of Fars in the development of irrigation in the province, with imperial officials supervising projects on a regional scale that would have enriched aristocratic landowners as well as the imperial treasury through taxation.​[13]​ Alizadeh argues that irrigation projects were a standard feature of the dastkard, the large domains developed by the nobility or the crown.​[14]​ 
However, more agents than the state and aristocracy need to be taken into account. Wilkinson et al. claim there is a need to develop an overall conceptual framework for dealing with ancient water systems. They argue that for this reason, it may be necessary to shift the focus to a more ‘nuanced understanding of water management such as local management within an imperial framework’. They also emphasise that many ‘imperial’ projects were administered by small-scale social groups.​[15]​ Besides confirming the role of imperial investment and coordination on the Mesopotamian plains, research points to the increasing role played by large landholders in water management and land administration as one of the innovative aspects of the Early Islamic period, either as a feature that stimulated economic growth and economic development,​[16]​ or as a force that upset both the political and the ecological balance.​[17]​ 
Analysing a society’s institutional framework, including property rights regimes and bureaucratic organisation, can be seen as the key to formulating a hypothesis on the role played by human factors in environmental transformations. Rather than wealth, knowledge and technology, institutions constitute the framework that determines the diversity of human impact on the environment.​[18]​ It is through the study of institutional frameworks that we can understand how societies were more or less vulnerable to environmental hazards, and more or less capable of implementing sustainable forms of land-use.
 This article shows how the management of water resources implied the participation of local communities and the mutual cooperation of landholders. Recent anthropological and sociological research presents local rural communities as a focus for cooperation and the development of collective responsibilities in the management of common goods, including water management.​[19]​ Having a small number of actors in rural communities facilitated communication among the members and encouraged both the development of expertise and the potential to coordinate strategies.​[20]​ Frequent interaction in a localised physical setting fostered trusting relationships. Such a dynamic would have lowered monitoring costs and prevented free-riding problems.​[21]​ Local communities could organise the workforce, manage the crucial tasks of water management and resolve conflicts among the beneficiaries.​[22]​
Apart from describing several historical agents, this article also discusses how changes in the power relations between different social groups affected water management systems. Which roles did ruling dynasties, economic and social elites (landowners, government officials, merchants) and rural communities play in establishing water related policies? In order to answer this question, one needs to understand not only the political and administrative changes that occurred in the period discussed in this paper, but also how this was affected by the complex bundles of property rights in Ancient Iraq and the changes therein. In a recent contribution, Van Bavel, Campopiano and Dijkman show that ‘the late eighth and ninth centuries … saw the rise of large landholders from the Sawād who extended their domains and captured large parts of the surpluses’.​[23]​ These groups acquired political influence and were able to change taxation systems and property rights regimes, and through these changes were also able to modify water-related policies. We therefore need to consider the relationship between land ownership, land tax systems and the evolution of leasehold.
 Studies on European water management (in particular in the Low Countries) have considered the interaction between state intervention, property rights regimes and the local level of water-resource administration.​[24]​ Likewise, for the Mesopotamian plains, a more nuanced analysis is needed of the complex relations between land ownership, surplus extraction and water rights. This will lead to a better understanding how different economic and political interests were integrated in multi-layered systems of water management. In the following I first describe the environmental change and collapse, then I describe and explain the administrative reforms leading to higher integration levels of the administrative layers between the late fifth century and the early seventh century. Then I treat the Islamic period and first evaluate the laws, particular the strenghtening of individual property rights. In the last paragraph I describe how landownership and tax systems changed.

Water infrastructures and environmental change (6th-10th centuries)

The delicate ecological balance that sustained the high soil productivity of the Mesopotamian plains could be seriously harmed. Summer heat could dry out the land, and the expansion of the tilled surface area was dependent upon extensive irrigation works.​[25]​ Floods or changes in the course of the Tigris and the Euphrates could also seriously threaten the environment, turning the tillable surface into a swamp. Additionally, insufficient drainage could increase the level of salinisation, causing serious harm to agriculture. Some of these changes were wrought by human agency, like irresponsible land administration. In this paragraph some are described, in particular the ones leading to the environmental breakdown in the Islamic period.
Iraqi agriculture seems to have reached its peak during the Late Sasanian period (6th-early 7th centuries). Adams’ research demonstrates how the cultivation of the Diyālā region, east of what would later become Baghdad, reached a highpoint in Late Sasanian times.​[26]​ Recent studies confirm the high level of canal construction activity in the area during this period.​[27]​ There is also evidence of investment in hydraulic infrastructure in the Late Sasanian period in other parts of the Empire, such as the large irrigation canals revealed by satellite photographs and archaeological surveys along the edge of the Aras River terrace on the Mughan Steppe.​[28]​ The most interesting case is that of the Qātūl al-Kisrawī, a giant feeder canal, c. 100 km long, that was drawn from the Tigris. It was intended to supply the lower Nahrawān​[29]​ and to relieve the chronic water shortages in some parts of the region. Islamic geographers and scholars such as Yāqūt ar-Rūmī (1179-1229) and al-Qazwīnī (1203?-1283) attributed the building of the canal to Husraw.​[30]​ As Alistair Northedge notes, the construction of the Qātūl ‘fundamentally changed the landscape by the digging of canal beds of enormous dimensions’.​[31]​ The king established the three administrative districts of the Upper, Middle, and Lower Nahrawān, where the Qātūl al-Kisrawī played a central role in the canal system.​[32]​ The two original inlets of the Qātūl al-Kisrawī, now commonly referred to as Nahr al-Raṣāṣī, which has an offtake from the Tigris at the northern end of the site of Samarra,​[33]​ and Nahr al-Qā’im, which has an offtake from the Tigris below Tell al-Suwwân, were probably also Late Sasanian.​[34]​
There seems to have been a high degree of continuity in the infrastructure systems of the Late Sasanian and Early Islamic periods. In the case of the Diyālā region, this is emphasised by Adams, who argues that in the Early Islamic period this area still benefited from the canal infrastructure developed in the Late Sasanian period.​[35]​ There are other examples of such continuity, such as the four great canals that connected the Tigris and the Euphrates (Nahr al-Malik, Nahr Sarsar, Nahr Kūtā, and Nahr ‘Īsā), three of which were definitely of pre-Islamic origin.​[36]​ It is uncertain whether the fourth, the Nahr ‘Īsā, was built by ‘Īsā ibn ‘Alī when Baghdad was founded (in the year 762) or whether his name was given to a pre-existing canal.​[37]​ Northedge’s excavations in the area of Samarra reveal continuity of occupation between the Sasanian and Islamic periods in several sites.​[38]​ 
However, there is evidence of a breakdown in the agricultural system, in particular by the mid-ninth century and several types of evidence exist, which I will summarise in the following. According to Adams, the tilled surface area in the Diyālā region shrank from 8,000 km2 at the end of the Sasanian era to just 6,000 km2 by the middle of the ninth century.​[39]​ Two cities, five smaller urban centres, three large towns and ninety villages or boroughs were abandoned soon after the end of the Samarran period.​[40]​ According to Adams, other archaeological surveys conducted in the floodplain of the Central Euphrates show a decline in land use from the seventh century onwards, and the land was almost abandoned in the ninth and tenth centuries.​[41]​ Of course, there are various methodological risks involved in using, as Adams does, the absence of diagnostic sherds to prove the absence of occupation at a site, one of which is the need ito use pottery to establish a relative chronology of settlement.​[42]​ However, the process of abandonment seems to have taken place over several centuries, therefore reducing the possibility of making an error in relation to chronology or settlement occupation. Furthermore, written sources progressively show less evidence of irrigation works taking place from the ninth century onwards.​[43]​ It is also telling that whilst in 819, according to the jurist Qudāma Ibn Dja‘far, the revenue of Iraq was 177,200 kurr of wheat, 99,721 kurr of barley and 8,095,800 dirhams,​[44]​ in the mid-ninth century, the geographer Ibn Khurdādbih reported that the revenue of as-Sawād amounted to 70,650 kurr of wheat, 112,050 kurr of barley or rice and 11,848,840 dirhams.​[45]​ One is immediately struck by the abrupt fall in wheat production and yet rice and barley were more robust grains and capable of growing in highly saline soils. 
The decline of wheat production and the cultivation of more robust grains such as rice and barley point to an increasing salinization of the soil. We have clear evidence of extreme degradation of the soil due to salinisation in the area of Basra in Southern Iraq. Many of the large estates in Southern Iraq were planted with sugar cane. This is a crop that needs to be watered frequently, resulting in salinisation of the soil. This problem was so pronounced in the plains around Basra that Zandj, African slaves, were brought in to remove by hand the salty layers of the soil in order to keep the land of Southern Iraq cultivable.​[46]​ At the end of the ninth century, their terrible working conditions prompted a rebellion that shook the foundations of the Abbasid Caliphate. In the tenth century, there also seems to have been a sharp fall in the urban population, as declining agricultural production was unable to sustain numbers at their current level.​[47]​ It is also clear that land-tax revenue in Iraq declined drastically between the ninth and tenth centuries, possibly by a factor of ten. We find total figures of 125,000,000 or 123,740,000 dirhams (silver coins) for the period of Harūn ar-Rashīd, whereas for the financial year 918-919, the total was only 27,354,100 dirhams. The decline can be attributed to a general reduction in the tilled surface area and overall land productivity.​[48]​

Water management, land tax and land tenure in the Late Sasanian period (5th-7th centuries)

In the introduction, we suggested that the administration of the land tax and of the water management were deeply interrelated in Late Antiquity. Here we will investigate how reforms affected the integration of the several layers of administration. The administration of the land tax underwent great changes in the Late Sasanian period due to the reforms introduced by King Kawād (488-496 and 498-531) and continued by King Husraw Anōšag-ruwān (531-579). Not every part of the large and heterogeneous Sasanian Empire was affected in the same way by the reforms. Recent research, and in particular important work by Pourshariati, shows the complexity of the political relationships on which the Empire was based. Some clans and local rulers preserved a high level of political and fiscal autonomy.​[49]​ The area of Iraq with the Persian system of capital cities, however, the main ‘bread basket’ of the Empire, was undoubtedly affected more directly by the political and administrative reforms. The crown tried to modify patterns of surplus distribution through a new system of tax assessment. A cadastre was started under Kawād and completed under Husraw Anōšag-ruwān. The cadastre provided the foundation for a reform of land-tax assessment that led to a more centralised system of surplus extraction, with the bureaucracy more closely involved in the work of tax collection at every level. The land tax was collected on the basis of a fixed amount of money or crops per unit of surface area. The tax rate varied according to the nature of the crops. For example, tax rates for fields cultivated with wheat were different those for fields cultivated as vineyards.​[50]​ The role of state officers in tax collection became more important at every level. 
We can reconstruct these transformations of the administration on the basis of documents in Middle Persian, sometimes written in the sixth or seventh century, or also on the basis of later Arabic works which were largely based on previous Sasanian texts. Arabic texts tend to reflect propagandistic views of the Sasanian monarchy expressed by the Middle-Persian works on which they directly or indirectly depend. However, their accounts are in broad terms coherent with the structure of the Sasanian administration that emerged from the Hazār Dādestān and the Pahlavi documents, and reflect therefore core real administration practices​[51]​. 
The Hazār Dādestān, a collection of legal rulings by seventh-century Zoroastrian jurists, reveals a complex tax and administrative system. To some extent, the information provided by this legal text can be checked against the limited collections of Middle-Persian documents that have emerged in the course of recent decades. Of particular interest is the Berkeley Pahlavi Archive, dating from the middle of the seventh century. The precisely dated documents range from 643/644 to 682/683.​[52]​ The levying of taxes lay in the hands of the state bureaucracy and the hierarchies of the Zoroastrian church. The mowbed, or ‘chief priest,’ and the rad, or ‘spiritual master’, seem to have played significant roles in tax collection.​[53]​ The ‘judge’ (dādwar) played an extremely important role in land administration, as he had expertise in what we would now call ‘property rights.’ He knew what (če), how much (čand), how (čiyōn), and in what form (če-ēwēnag) landowners held the land.​[54]​ These competencies were similar to those of a modern day cadastral bureau. The judge had authority over the tāsūg, which seems to have been the smallest administrative division above the village (deh in Middle Persian).​[55]​ Another official who clearly played a role in tax collection was the ōstāndar, who was also responsible for tax assessment (sāk abar nihād).​[56]​ The ōstāndar’s role in financial administration is confirmed by documents in the Berkeley Pahlavi Archive, which show that the ōstāndar monitored the expenses and payments of other administrators who depended on him.​[57]​
Arabic sources and translations of Middle Persian texts confirm the existence of a bureaucratic structure devoted to more direct control of the system of surplus extraction by the central authority. One important account of the tax reform is to be found in the historical work Ta’rīkh al-rusūl wa-l-mulūk, written by aṭ-Ṭabarī (839-923). He states that the judges in each administrative district received a copy of the tax register in order to prevent extortion. They also had to inform the king about the condition of the land, so that taxes could be remitted in the case of crop failure.​[58]​ Ibn al-Muqaffa’ (d. 756/759), one of the most important translators of Middle Persian texts, stated that Husraw appointed officers to supervise crop failures and remit taxes in the case of shortages.​[59]​
 The Sīrat Anūshirwān presents the most revealing account of Husraw’s reforms. The Sīrat Anūshirwān is a first-person narrative of the main deeds of Husraw, probably based on ancient Middle Persian rulers’ deeds,​[60]​ preserved in the Tajārib al-umam written by Miskawayh (ca. 1030).​[61]​ It contains some interesting elements that help us to understand how the process of tax collection worked. The fiscal prefect (‘āmil in Arabic or āmārgar in Middle Persian, as mentioned above) and the taxpayers (ahl al-kharādj) had the right to present complaints to the judge (qāḍī, probably the dādwar described above). The fiscal prefect, the judge, the amīn ahl al-balad and the region’s scribe (kātib al-kūra, or shahr-dibīr, a royal tax collector sent to the province​[62]​) reported to the royal department.​[63]​ The taxpayers of each district gathered in the chief town with their leader (qā’id, probably the local lord), the judge, and the amīn ahl al-balad (‘the trustworthy amongst the people of the country’) to discuss their problems with the king’s representatives.​[64]​ The judges also had to assemble the inhabitants of the district without revealing their actions to the lords or fiscal prefects.​[65]​ Delegates from the district, even from the peasantry, were able to report to the government.​[66]​ Although the description of the tax reform in the Sīrat Anūshirwān is ideological to a large extent, it does broadly agree with the account of structure of the Sasanian administration that emerges from the Hazār Dādestān, especially the duty of supervision that was accorded to the judges. 
The inclusion of some form of local participation is probably related to the strong property rights held by peasants.  At that time, the main form of tenancy was permanent share-cropping for one-quarter to one-third of the crop. The sharecropper held permanent rights to the land and could sublet it if he wished, which made the sharecroppers important stakeholders in land management and more interested in long-term investments in land.​[67]​
By acquiring a larger and steadier share of surplus extraction through the land tax and administrative reforms, at least in Iraq, the Sasanian crown had both an interest in and the possibility of investing in water management. Bureaucrats were directly involved in water management. According to Ibn Qutayba ad-Dīnawarī, a ninth-century Iraqi scholar, the Persians used to say that the secretary who does not know about water mains, digging, closing canal locks and other water management issues is a useless secretary.​[68]​ The ‘judge’ (dādwar), whose supervisory function and role in cadastre assessment has already been discussed, was also able to resolve private disputes concerning water management.​[69]​
The activities of local landholders were integrated and coordinated by this bureaucracy. The Hazār Dādestān shows how some canals were owned by private investors, either jointly or individually. Elman points out that this source refers to over-ground canals dug for irrigation, which were sourced from major rivers, such as the Tigris and the Euphrates, and from larger canals.​[70]​ The Hazār Dādestān tries to establish rules concerning possible uses of these canals by the community at large. For example, it states that if a canal dug by an individual owner runs around a plot owned by other landholders, the former may not dig an outflow until he has made an agreement with the owner of the canals and paid him compensation.​[71]​ However, most of the paragraphs concerning irrigation deal with canals co-owned by different landholders, who also enter into partnerships for the division of agricultural revenues. According to the Hazār Dādestān, a man who had individually borne  the cost of indispensable maintenance for canals that were co-owned jointly with others could enlist the judge’s support for his claims for adequate compensation for his expenditure, if his partners and co-owners refused to collaborate.​[72]​ Until he was reimbursed, he was entitled to hold as a security the part of the estate belonging to the co-owners.​[73]​
	To summarise, the administrative reforms of Husraw’s period allowed the activities of local communities to be integrated into the central bureaucracy. The new system had to be based on cadastral surveys, since a fixed amount of money was levied per unit of surface area, with tax rates varying according to the crops being grown. This meant that having a huge amount of data on land conditions was essential for the central administration. Furthermore, sources point to the existence of several control systems in which the bureaucracy and locals interacted. This is revealed, for example, by the duties of the judge, which included meeting and discussing with locals, hearing their complaints and possibly allowing tax remissions in the case of a bad harvest. The flow of information thus produced  helped the authorities to understand local conditions. The integration of different administrative levels and the availability of local knowledge were key factors in improving conditions for water management. The complex, multi-layered system of land and water management described above lay at the foundations of the expansion of irrigated agriculture on the Mesopotamian plain in the Late Sasanian period. 

Continuity and change between the Late Sasanian and Early Islamic periods (7th-10th centuries) 

As noted in the first paragraph on environmental change, archaeological evidence points to a degree of infrastructural continuity between the Late Sasanian period and the Early Islamic period. In this section, we ask how far there was also continuity in the administration of water management, as well as the related issues of land ownership and tax administration. One element of continuity was to be found in the established aristocratic and royal domains, between the Sasanian dastkard and the estate around the Islamic qaṣr. The rise of desert castles in an area dominated by Umayyad dynasties in present-day Jordan, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, some of them built under Hisham, such as Qaṣr al-Ḥayr al-Sharqī and Qaṣr Ḥayr al-Gharbī, was to a certain extent connected to the expansion of irrigated agriculture.​[74]​ Similar structures may have been based on examples of edifices from the pre-Islamic period. Although in the case of Syria it has not yet proven possible to identify an edifice from pre-Islamic times that might have served as a model, studies in Mesopotamia have revealed a different situation. Recent work at Qaṣr Bani Muqatil by Finster and Schmidt has led to the re-advancement of the idea, originally proposed by the two scholars in the 1970s, that these buildings were built in the Sasanian period. Qaṣr Banī Muqātil in particular seems to date back to the sixth century.​[75]​ Although Marwanid investment in similar settlements is evident, it may have been based, to a large extent, on Sasanian models.​[76]​ The central authorities continued to play a crucial role in water management after the Arab conquest. The caliphs, both Umayyad and Abbasid, were involved in huge reclamation initiatives that helped them to expand their financial base. The caliphs tried to extend the estates under their direct control by reclaiming Sasanian crown land and swamp land, especially in the area of al-Batā’ih, the large swamps in lower central Iraq.​[77]​ We know of investments in land colonisation during the period of the Caliph Hishām, one example being the feeder canal built near Raqqa.​[78]​ Important initiatives were also taken under the first Abbasids. Considerable irrigation works were undertaken by the first members of the ‘Blessed Dynasty’, initially in the areas of Basra and Wāsit, with attention then shifting to the areas of Baghdad, Samarra and the central reaches of the Tigris River.​[79]​ Some of these works relied on existing Sasanian networks, such as the Qatul Abī al-Djund, built by Harūn ar-Rashīd (786-809) with the intention of irrigating the zone between the Nahrawân and the Tigris to the north of Baghdad, thereby integrating the Nahrawān canal system.​[80]​
Islamic jurists focused on the government’s duties in relation to building and maintaining infrastructure. Abū Yusūf (d. 798), who was appointed qāḍī (judge) of Baghdad on the order of the Caliph Hārūn ar-Rashīd, put much emphasis on the revival of the ‘dead lands’ and the importance of irrigation for this purpose in his Kitāb al-Kharādj, Book of Land Tax.​[81]​ He argued that ‘if the main canals and watercourses, from the Tigris and Euphrates, need clearing and cleaning the expenses should be borne by the Treasury and by those directly benefiting from such watercourses’.​[82]​ He also stated that ‘the expense of the upkeep of the walls on the river banks, to prevent flooding, of the dams and the water locks on the Tigris and Euphrates and similar great rivers, must be borne by the Treasury alone, because it is in the public interest that they should be kept in order as any malfunction will cause damage to agriculture and decrease the income from taxation’.​[83]​ Qudāma affirmed that major Muslim jurists, such as Abū Ḥanīfa (ca. 699-767) and Malik (708/716?-796), also asserted that the supervision of irrigation and the damming of the overflows of the great rivers had to be sustained by the government at the expense of the treasury.​[84]​ A later source, the Kitāb al-Ḥāwī, a mathematical tract for the tax collectors in Iraq that was probably written in the second quarter of the eleventh century, refers to several calculations for the digging and administration of canals. Claude Cahen stresses that the care taken by tax-collectors in relation to the digging of canals had to do with the necessity of guaranteeing a stable income from the land tax.​[85]​
Islamic jurists also discussed issues relating to the joint management of water resources, which are also clearly present in the Hazār Dādestān.​[86]​ Abū Yusūf stresses that all Muslims are partners in the use of the large rivers, such as the Tigris and the Euphrates. If someone wants to run a canal from one of these to irrigate his land, he will only be allowed to do so if this does not damage the river.​[87]​ Abū Yusūf writes that those who jointly own a canal must make a proportional contribution to its digging and dredging. If some of the owners of a canal decide to strengthen its walls for fear that they might break, the other partners can be forced to share the expenses if it is thought that a lack of maintenance will cause damage.​[88]​ Yaḥyā ibn Ādam (d. 818) describes a tradition whereby when people divide land, they are meant to regulate water rights among themselves, and they are considered partners with right of pre-emption.​[89]​ Yaḥyā ibn Ādam also reports traditions against and in favour of the sale of surplus water for irrigation, allowing it to be used by neighbours.​[90]​ This problem may have been related to the strengthening of individual property rights over land, which may have caused conflicts between the eighth and ninth centuries (when Yaḥyā ibn Ādam lived).​[91]​ He also reports the tradition that if a man were cut off from a source of water by someone else’s land, he could legitimately let an irrigation canal pass through his neighbour’s property.​[92]​ This situation contradicts a statement in Abū Yusūf’s book, in which the jurist claims that a man cannot dig a canal through someone’s else land without his permission, although a landowner cannot prevent his neighbour’s canal from running through his land if this how the canal lay when he acquired the property.​[93]​ Again, this points to a strengthening of individual property rights over land and water. 
It is clear from the above that central authority continued to play a crucial role in the expansion and maintenance of water infrastructure in the early Islamic period. Islamic law maintained forms of cooperation among different landholders in the use of water resources (as they existed in the Sasanian period), but it also showed a strengthening of individual property rights in relation to water.  



Change in land ownership and tax assessment in the Islamic period (7th-10th centuries)

In this section, we will show how an important new feature of the Islamic period, the strengthening of individual property rights over water, was linked to two new developments: the increasing amount of land held by political and economic elites, and the transformation of property rights over land. The latter was related to and influenced by changes in the tax assessment system. The overall result was that the state lost some of its control over water management as it came into the hands of new elites.
	After the conquest, land-tax assessment in Iraq continued to follow the general outlines of Sasanian surplus collection, and the land tax remained the main source of state income. ​[94]​ The main land tax, described in juridical sources as the tax imposed on the land of conquered populations who had not accepted Islam before the conquest and had not signed a special agreement (ṣulḥ),​[95]​ was usually called kharādj.​[96]​ The word kharādj is undoubtedly of pre-Arabic origin (perhaps from the Akkadian ilku),​[97]​ and it probably passed into Arabic usage through Sasanian administration. In the Hazār Dādestān, we find the word harg, which probably refers to the land tax. In the documents of the Pahlavi archive in Berkeley, we find a functionary called frašn-hargarīg, who probably had to identify the contributors subject to the land tax, since frašn means question and hargarīg is related to harg. Tax assessment on kharādj land mainly followed a system called ‘alā l-misāḥa: a fixed amount of money and/or crops was collected from a fixed portion of land (usually one djarīb, that is, 1,592 m2),​[98]​ thus continuing the Sasanian system in this respect.​[99]​ Like the Late Sasanian kings, the Umayyads also carried out land surveys. For example, a land survey in Northern Mesopotamia was held in 691/2,​[100]​ and a land survey of the Sawād was conducted in 105 AH (723-724 AD) by the governor ‘Umar Ibn Hubayra, at the request of King Yazīd II.​[101]​ 
	However, water management and, in particular, land reclamation, were also entrusted to private initiatives. To a large extent, water management passed into the hands of new landed elites. Reclamation was encouraged through land grants and tax cuts. Islamic law granted ownership of the soil to people who revived ‘dead land’, land out of tillage, usually because of a lack of irrigation. These qatī‘a (the Arabic word for these land grants) could yield very high revenues. ‘Abd Allāh ibn Darrādj, for example, was able to reclaim swamp land that yielded five or even 15,000,000 dirhams (silver coins).​[102]​ These land grants could be enormous, covering as much as 1,592 m2.​[103]​ 
	There were disputes among the jurists concerning the necessity of having a land grant as a condition for taking possession of the land. At-Ṭaḥāwī (853-893) writes that according to Abū Ḥanīfa, land could only be reclaimed by agreement of the Imam, a principle with which he agreed.​[104]​ The concession (iqṭā‘) of the Imam became void if the person who wanted to reclaim the land had failed to cultivate it within three years.​[105]​ To a large extent, this was a theoretical discussion; land grants and reclamation went together. In most cases, only the wealthy were able to undertake this work, and this led to an expansion of the big estates.​[106]​ Arabic sources offer some concrete evidence of how members of the elite were awarded these grants. One interesting example is provided by Al-Balāḏurī, the famous historian of the Arab conquest, who describes the reclamation project of Maslama, the son of the Umayyad caliph ‘Abd al-Malik, in Southern Iraq during the reign of al-Walīd (705-715).​[107]​ Maslama proposed to invest money in a reclamation project, the cost of which had been estimated at about 3,000,000 dirhams. Maslama requested that the land that remained under water be given to him as qatī‘a. The reclamation project was so successful that farmers were brought in to work the land, and many other people entrusted their farms (diyyā‘) to Maslama for ‘protection’.​[108]​
	Specific tax arrangements existed to promote land reclamation. Owners of privately reclaimed land usually only paid the tithe (but there were juridical debates concerning this point) or even only half of the tithe, due to the extensive artificial irrigation works or drainage that had been carried out.​[109]​ Many of the land grants given by caliphs and governors consisted of dead land from the area around Basra, a tithe-paying area important for its sugar cane plantations.​[110]​ The largest estates were frequently used for market-oriented monocultures, often, from the end of the seventh century, due to the introduction of Zandj, the African slaves mentioned above.​[111]​ 
	We have stated  that in the Sasanian period permanent share-cropping for one-quarter to one-third of the crop, dominated the property structure. After the Islamic conquest, while the landed elites were expanding their influence, it also seems that short-term leases were becoming the dominant form of land tenure, creating insecurity and therefore reducing tenants’ incentives to invest in land. In early medieval Iraq, sharecroppers holding grain land (muzāraʿa), held their land mostly for only one or two years.​[112]​
	The need to maintain good relationships between the new dynasty and the landholding elites of Iraq probably led to the redefinition of the system of surplus extraction and distribution. The land-tax collection system was reformed, with the diffusion of a new system of tax assessment, the muqāsama, on kharādj land in Iraq. According to al-Balādhurī, at the end of the reign of al-Manṣūr (754-775), the Muslims of Iraq requested that the tax assessment system be changed. Under al-Mahdī, a new taxation system was enforced, based on a share of the crops. This system was known as muqāsama. Yahyā Ibn ’Adam wrote of the muqāsama in the Sawād: ‘the people (nās) asked for this from the ruler in the last period of the Caliph al-Manṣūr’s reign’.​[113]​ Under this form of tax assessment, instead of a fixed amount of money or crops, taxpayers were required to pay a share of the crop: one half of the crop for land irrigated by flooding, a third for land irrigated by waterwheel, and one quarter for land irrigated by animal-turned wheels, according to al-Māwardī.​[114]​ According to Qudāma Ibn Dja‘far, the system was introduced thanks to the support of Abū ‘Ubayd Allāh,​[115]​ the first author to write a book on kharādj, who was appointed under al-Manṣūr to the retinue of his heir al-Mahdī, and vizier under al-Mahdī’s government (probably appointed in 775, died 786-787).​[116]​ This reinforces the notion that there was an agreement between the Muslim Iraqis (nās in the Arabic text of Balādhurī) and a scholar who held a key position in the imperial administration (the vizier). Scholars who have investigated the economic views of Abū Yūsuf have explained his support for muqāsama on the grounds that this system would be more bearable for farmers.​[117]​ This is an important point; local elites would doubtless have preferred to avoid having peasants flee the land due to an excessive tax burden. Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, for example, complains of the oppressive effects of ‘alā ’l-misāḥa and of the absence of clear regulations for farmers.​[118]​ However, one should not forget the larger economic and social context in which surplus extraction took place. The dependent peasantry mainly worked the land of the Iraqi Muslim landed elite. The surplus that was extracted had to be shared between the landed elite, who were taking rent, and the state, which was taking taxes. Moreover, the Abbasids, who had been in power for about twenty years, had to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Muslims, who had given them valuable support in their rise to power. The muqāsama would have implied a less stable tax income for the state compared to the fixed amount of cash or crops collected under the ‘alā ’l-misāḥa system.​[119]​
However, the potential for weakening effects did not go unnoticed by Muslim scholars. For example, aṭ-Ṭabarī (839-923) gave a favourable account of the tax reform enforced by Husraw, since cadastral assessments, a land tax based on fixed rates and a centralisation of tax revenue would have strengthened the state.​[120]​ As taxation was not based on fixed cadastral assessments, but required a calculation of the state’s share, the role of intermediaries who could ensure some form of stable income became more important. The difficulty of estimating tax revenue was one of the reasons why the Abbasid Empire resorted to using more tax-farmers, as the latter would pay a fixed sum to the state in exchange for tax-collection rights. The recourse to intermediaries finally culminated in the creation of the iqtā‘ system, a devolution of tax collection rights in exchange for services to the state (such as military service) under the Buwayhid (945-1055). Tax-farming and iqtā‘ either assured a more stable income for the state, or saved the government from paying salaries to officers and soldiers and hiring agents to collect taxes around the empire. The role played by tax-farmers (ḍāmin) was extremely important. In the year 280 AH, for example, the entire Sawād income depended on a contract with Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad aṭ-Ṭā’ī.​[121]​
Tax-farming was possible at different levels; at the level of central or local government, or even at that of smaller districts. Before a contract was signed, the sum to be handed over to the state, which consisted of the general amount of revenue and all extra charges, was fixed on the basis of previous income from that area. At the request of the tax-farmer, the treasury could also allocate some funds for important works in the farmed area, such as irrigation. However, the tax-farmers were expected to undertake tasks such as ground amelioration and hydraulic works, and their activities were controlled by inspectors.​[122]​ As the contract ran for a limited period, the interest of the tax-farmer lay in the opportunity to minimise costs (including ground amelioration costs) in order to maximise profits. He therefore had a greater interest in ‘squeezing’ money from tax-payers than in investing in water management. The tax-farmer was forced to hand over a fixed sum to the state, even if the general revenue was smaller than the sum agreed in the contract.​[123]​ In the case of a decline in revenue, the tax-farmer, who was unable to modify the sum to be handed over to the state, would try to increase the burden on the taxpayers. To offer the necessary financial guarantees to the state, tax-farmers had to be chosen from the upper echelons of Abbasid Society. According to al-Muqtadir’s vizier Ibn al-Furāt, three social groups could act as tax-farmers; merchants (tādjir), trustworthy officers (‘āmil wafī) and wealthy landlords (tān ghanī).​[124]​ The role played by merchants, and in particular grain merchants, is very relevant, because it suggests a clear link between tax-farming and the grain trade. Tax‑farmers often abused their position in order to speculate on grain prices.​[125]​ 
To summarise, the establishment of water management policies in the Early Islamic period fell first into the hands of large landowners with strong political ties, and then into the hands of tax-farmers, who were often also powerful landholders, merchants and important officials. This pattern of limited intervention by the central authority and interaction between central rulers and local communities was typical of the Sasanian period. 

Conclusion

The article has shown how organisation of water management in Late Antique and Early Medieval Iraq should  be studied in the broader institutional context in which it is placed (property rights, tax administration etc.). The organisation of water management in Late Sasanian Iraq depended on a highly complex system of interaction between local communities, aristocratic rulers and the imperial bureaucracy. This interaction allowed the government to gather information from different regions of the empire and to understand the needs of the different stakeholders. As such, the system provided a favourable institutional framework for the expansion of irrigated agriculture. 
The system changed when landholding conditions were transformed in the Early Islamic period. We have argued that in this period, changes were made to the system of tax collecting and land tenure that favoured landed elites. These ninth-century transformations allowed the influence of a group of tax-farmers (large landholders, merchants and important officials) to increase. Irrigation policies were therefore bent to the interests of these new elites, which often lay in short-term gains rather than in long-term success. As suggested by Van Bavel, Campopiano, and Dijkman, the eighth and ninth centuries saw the rise of an elite of landholders, tax-farmers and merchant bankers, who came to control a large part of the land and its surpluses.​[126]​ We can add that they also came to control the water management system, using it to serve their short-term interests. The fact that they managed to achieve the upper hand in water management often led to the exclusion of other stakeholders, such as local communities, in the process of forming water policies. My research strongly suggests that in the long run, these socio-economic and institutional changes contributed substantially to the breakdown of the agricultural system in Ancient Iraq.
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